The standard case for market-based incentives requires a tax or price on each unit of emissions. Each form of abatement is then pursued until the marginal cost of reducing pollution matches the tax per unit of pollution, and the resulting combination of abatement technologies minimizes social costs (Pigou 1920) . For vehicles, a tax on emissions could induce drivers to: (1) buy a newer, cleaner car, (2) buy a smaller, more fuel-efficient car, (3) fix their broken pollution control equipment, (4) buy cleaner gasoline, (5) drive less, (6) drive less aggressively, and (7) avoid cold start-ups. 1 Moreover, economic efficiency requires different combinations of these methods for different consumers.
Yet the technology is not available to measure each car's emissions in a reliable and cost-effective manner. On-board diagnostic equipment is imperfect, and it is costly to retrofit millions of vehicles (Harrington and McConell 2003) . Remote sensing is less expensive and has been used to identify high-polluting vehicles, but it cannot measure emissions clearly enough to tax each car. 2 Moreover, vehicle emissions are important. In 2001, vehicles in the U.S. contributed 27 percent of volatile organic compounds (VOC), 37 percent of nitrogen oxides (NO x ), and 66 percent of carbon monoxide (CO) emissions. 3 For these reasons, vehicle emission policies have relied almost solely on mandates: refineries must make clean gasoline, and new cars must meet required emission standards. 4 Yet the mandated combination of abatement methods is unlikely to match the cost-minimizing combination that households would choose if faced with a tax on emissions. In fact, the cost of abatement using such mandates can be several times the minimum cost achieved by using an emissions tax (Newell and Stavins 2003) .
While the inability to measure emissions may preclude a vehicle emissions tax, it does not preclude any use of incentives. Those who sell new or used cars or light-trucks can collect tax on vehicle characteristics that are associated with emissions, or provide subsidy for vehicles with low emissions. Most states charge annual registration fees that can be made to depend on vehicle characteristics. Such policies might reduce emission rates, while changes in the gasoline tax can reduce miles driven.
What vehicle characteristics or behaviors should be targeted by a tax or subsidy? How would consumers react to those new incentive instruments? How much would each tax reduce emissions? To address these questions, we build a general purpose model of discrete choices by households about how many cars to own and what types of cars to own, plus continuous choices about how far to drive. In our model, we embrace individual heterogeneity. We estimate all decisions simultaneously, and we use the estimated parameters to predict the effects of certain price changes on choices and on emissions.
Several existing papers explore market incentives that could be used in place of a tax on emissions. 5 In addition, several papers estimate models of the discrete choice among vehicle bundles (including number, size, and age categories). 6 Some models estimate the demand for gasoline or for vehicle miles traveled (VMT) as functions of price and income (as reviewed in Harrington and McConell 2003) . As well, we note that other models predict emissions. 7 A major contribution of our research, then, is to include all such choices simultaneously. In general, we capture the effect of any price change on each household's choices about the number of vehicles to buy, the type and age of each, the consequent emissions rates, miles driven, and the consequent total emissions.
In a two-step procedure, Dubin and McFadden (1984) estimate a discrete choice model (for household appliances) and use the predicted shares to correct for endogeneity in the estimation of a continuous choice (usage hours). Others extend this model to the discrete choice among vehicle bundles and a continuous choice of miles (e.g. Goldberg 1998; West 2004) . A single set of parameters appear both in the indirect utility function used to estimate discrete choices and in continuous demands. Using this sequential procedure, however, the estimated parameters of the continuous demand are not constrained to match the same parameters in the estimated discrete choice model. Hanemann (1984) proposes a method to estimate discrete and continuous demands at the same time. Bhat (2005) allows consumers to choose multiple discrete alternatives, while Bhat et al. (2009) use this approach to analyze the effects of gasoline price on the choice of vehicle type, vintage, and use. Bento et al. (2009) estimate car choices and miles driven with one set of parameters; they combine those demands with a model of new and used car supplies to simulate efficiency and distributional effects of an increase in the gasoline tax. These papers estimate discrete and continuous demands in one step with one set of parameters, but without the same individual error term in both choices. This unobserved individual heterogeneity is a key factor in the Dubin-McFadden model. Relative to this literature, we make a number of contributions. First, we capture the simultaneity of these decisions by proposing a method for consistent estimation of both discrete and continuous choices in one step with the same individual error term, yielding a single set of parameters. In other words, whereas the Dubin-McFadden method corrects for selection of vehicle on the choice of miles, our procedure allows for individual unobserved heterogeneity to affect both the fuel demand and the choice 5 For examples, see Eskeland and Devarajan (1996) , Innes (1996) , Kohn (1996) , Train et al. (1997) , Plaut (1998) , Sevigny (1998) , and West (2002, 2010) . For a review article, see Parry et al. (2007) . 6 See McFadden (1979) , Mannering and Clifford (1985) , Train (1986) , Brownstone et al. (1996) , Goldberg (1998) , Brownstone and Train (1999) , West (2004) , and other papers reviewed in McFadden (2001) . 7 For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1998, p.3-68) discusses the use of EPA's MOBILE5a model or California's EMFAC7F model. of vehicles simultaneously. Second, we allow for two continuous choices of miles -in each vehicle of a two-vehicle household. These choices are bundle-specific. 8 Third, we allow for an additional continuous choice of the age of each vehicle. Fourth, we use the estimated parameters not only to predict changes in choices about vehicles and miles, but also how those choices affect emissions. 9 As it turns out, results for all continuous demands are broadly similar for the sequential and simultaneous models. For discrete choices, however, our simultaneous model finds substantially larger effects from a change in the gas price per mile, income, or vehicle-specific costs. Signs of some elasticities are reversed. In other words, household-specific heterogeneity does affect discrete choices.
We find that a higher price of gasoline would shift households out of the Car-SUV pair and into the bundle with two cars. It also would reduce miles driven. Both of these changes reduce emissions. A tax on vehicle age would induce shifts to newer vehicles and would also shift families out of bundles with an SUV. Both of these changes also reduce emissions. Similarly, a tax on SUV's would shift families into cars and reduce emissions. The size of such a shift is important for environmental policy. Rather than pin down the exact size of key parameters, however, this paper points to important problems with existing methods and suggests an alternative approach with more internal consistency.
The next section describes a behavioral choice model for one-vehicle households and then extends it to consider two-vehicle bundles. It also presents a new method designed for jointly estimating all discrete and continuous choices. Section 2 describes data sources, while Sect. 3 provides estimation results for both discrete and continuous demands. Section 4 compares elasticities, and Sect. 4 concludes.
The model and estimation
All cars in a given year are made to a single emission rate standard, while a weaker standard has applied to "sports utility vehicles" (SUV, for short, but defined here to include all light trucks and vans). For each vehicle, we therefore model the discrete choice between a car and SUV. Each household also faces a discrete choice among a finite number of vehicle bundles. The nesting structure is shown in Fig. 1 . One choice is the number of vehicles (0, 1, or 2), and another choice for each vehicle is the type of vehicle (a car or an SUV). Other structures are possible, of course, including all options on the same level. For our final model, we use the structure shown in the figure. The choice of vehicle age is also important for emissions, so we also model this decision. 10 A household that chooses two vehicles has four continuous choices: age of each vehicle and miles to drive each vehicle. 11 Our model requires a price that does not depend on the amount demanded, but the price per year of age is not linear (because owning a new car costs more depreciation per year than owning an old car). We therefore construct a continuous variable called "Wear", the fraction of a vehicle that has depreciated (between 0 and 1). A constant rate of depreciation means that Wear is a nonlinear function of age, but then the price per unit of Wear does not depend on its amount. This price is estimated for each vehicle type using hedonic regressions below. The household makes a discrete choice about a brand-new "concept vehicle", and then gets reimbursed by the price of Wear for accepting an older car. In other words, in our model, a household makes simultaneous decisions about which concept vehicles, how old, and miles to drive. Specifically, "Wear" is calculated for each car in our sample by assuming 20 % depreciation per year, so Wear = 1 − (1 − 0.2) age . Thus, a new car has Wear = 0.
Then, since choice of age is considered separately, each discrete vehicle bundle must be defined in a way that is independent of age. For this reason, we define each "concept" vehicle as a bundle of attributes of a brand-new vehicle (car or SUV). The household must pay the price of that brand-new vehicle (the "capital cost"), but then it gets back some money for accepting Wear on that vehicle (the "reimbursement" price of Wear).
Since the discrete choice in Dubin and McFadden (1984) involves only two alternatives, that paper can use a simple logit model. Our model has six choices, however, and so we require a more general logit structure. We use the nested logit. The next subsection describes the simple case for households with only one vehicle, and the second 10 Older vehicles have higher emissions both because older vintages were produced to weaker standards and because pollution control equipment deteriorates with age. Panel data would be required to distinguish these. 11 Fullerton and West (2010) also simulate effects of incentives in a model of heterogeneous households' continuous choices of car size, car age, and VMT, but they use calibrated rather than estimated parameters. That model avoids discrete choices, but it considers only one car per agent. In our model, we estimate discrete choices to consider the household's number of vehicles. subsection considers multi-vehicle households. In the third and fourth sub-sections, we discuss the estimation procedure and elasticity calculations.
Our model of car choice and miles driven
This description starts with the choices of VMT and Wear, assuming that a one-car household has already chosen vehicle number-and-type bundle i. Given bundle i, an agent's direct utility is a function of VMT, Wear, and another consumption good c. That is, U = U (VMT i , Wear i , c i ). Given income y, the budget constraint is given by:
where p g is the price of gasoline (in dollars per gallon), and MPG i is fuel efficiency (in miles per gallon), so that p i ≡ p g /MPG i is the marginal price per mile in the ith vehicle bundle. The "reimbursement" price of Wear for vehicle type i is denoted as q i . The price of the other consumption good is normalized to be 1. The annualized capital cost of the concept-vehicle bundle is r i . Thus, gasoline is the only cost per mile, whereas capital cost is a fixed cost of each bundle. 12 The indirect utility for bundle i is a function of household income and prices, denoted as
One common way to obtain the indirect utility function is to use parametric demand and then solve a system of partial differential equations using Roy's identity (Hausman 1981) . For comparability with other studies, we want VMT demand as a log-linear function of the price per mile p i , available income y−r i , and a vector of observed sociodemographic variables x. We then add the reimbursement price q i to that equation to get:
where η represents an agent-specific unobserved factor (see below). Also, we assume
where k i is the total capital value of bundle i (depreciated or market value), δ is the annual rate of further depreciation in value, and ρ represents the interest and maintenance cost. When we plug (3) into (2) and integrate, the implied indirect utility is:
where 
This specification has pros and cons. One limitation is the use of specific functional forms, but these log-linear forms are comparable to prior literature and allow for two different demand functions (5a, 5b) that are consistent with a single indirect utility function (4). An advantage of this specification is that it allows the price of Wear (q i ) to enter the VMT demand, and price of VMT ( p i ) to enter the Wear demand, but a limitation is that the expression α i p p i − αi enters both demands the same way. 16 Also, both continuous demands have the same income effect, β. A more general model could not be estimated. Note, however, that we have added generality where it matters most. In particular, the price per mile has a bundle-specific coefficient (α i p ), to allow for different effects on the demand for miles in each type of vehicle. Thus a gas tax might decrease miles in an SUV more than in a car, in a way that depends on fuel efficiency, and the change in miles for each household can depend on their vehicle types. 13 Our model provides estimates of β and β 1 , and these can be used to calculate (δ + ρ), but we do not provide separate estimates of δ and ρ. Some of our steps below require an assumption about δ, and we use 20 % for this purpose. Estimates of the depreciation rate for automobiles range from 33 % (Jorgenson 1996) or 30 % (Hulten and Wykoff 1996) to 15 %, the rate implicit in the vehicle depreciation schedule currently used by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We use 20 % because it falls between these bounds. 14 Also, because of this integration, note that the intercept in (4) may be different from the intercept in (2). 15 More general demand functions such as translog demand or the almost ideal demand system imply much more complicated indirect utility functions that could not be estimated. Also, note that no-vehicle households have zero marginal prices, so they have constant miles traveled (conditioned on observed sociodemographic variables and total income). Thus, no continuous demand equations are needed for these households. 16 Thus, a change in p i must have the same effect on Wear that it has on miles. We tried other models, including one where indirect utility has separate terms exp(α i p p i ) and exp(αi ), so that p i would have no effect on Wear, and q i would have no effect on VMT. That model would not converge, and anyway it is restrictive by assuming no cross-price effects. We also tried models with more coefficients, to relax these restrictions, and we tried many starting points, but only the model in (4) and (5a, 5b) could be estimated simultaneously for discrete and continuous choices (especially for two-vehicle bundles considered below).
Two-vehicle households
So far, the model above considers only one vehicle, but many households have two vehicles and thus two continuous choices of miles and two continuous choices of Wear. We have the observed VMT and Wear for each vehicle, so we can incorporate all four continuous choices. 17 The direct utility for a two-vehicle household choosing bundle i is U (VMT i1 , VMT i2 , Wear i1 , Wear i2 , c i ). The budget constraint is given by:
where q i j are reimbursement prices for Wear in the two vehicles of bundle i( j = 1, 2). Also, p i j ≡ p g /M P ≡ G i j is the price per mile using the j th car of bundle i. We consider the indirect utility function as follows:
The indirect utility in (7) is similar to (4) except for two extra terms related to the second vehicle's gasoline price p i2 and reimbursement price q i2 . By Roy's identity, given that the household has chosen bundle i in (7), the four continuous demands are:
These demands generalize those of a one-vehicle household in (5a, 5b) by including terms for p i2 and q i2 (and so we refer to (8a-8d) for "all" demands). The demand for VMT i2 is symmetric to VMT i1 in explanatory variables, but it is non-linear in parameters of both p i1 and p i2 . The demands for Wear i j ( j = 1, 2) are similarly defined.
A procedure to estimate discrete and continuous demands simultaneously
Note that the same parameters appear in both discrete and continuous choice functions, yet previous literature has estimated these choice models separately. Often the estimates for the same parameters are different not only in magnitude but also in sign. In this sub-section, we propose a procedure for simultaneous estimation of bundle choice, vehicle age, and miles driven. We start with separate discussion of car choice and miles driven, and then how we combine them in a single estimation procedure.
Following McFadden's random utility hypothesis, vehicle bundle i is chosen if and only if: V i ≥ V j for all j = i. The unconditional expected share for bundle i then is:
where S i is the share choosing bundle i, and f (η) is the probability density function of the agent-specific error η. We are now in a position to describe the importance of η. On the one hand, individual heterogeneity represented by η could directly affect the choice of bundle. On the other hand, observed demands for VMT and Wear are conditional on that choice. Since the choice of vehicle bundle is endogenous, the estimated demands for VMT and Wear could be biased if the influence of η in (9) is ignored. In the model of Dubin and McFadden (1984) , the error term η can be cancelled out from the inequality {V i > V j , ∀ j = i}, which simplifies the calculation of probabilities (that is, the integration over η in Eq. (9) is not necessary). In such a model, η appears only in the continuous demands, so this individual heterogeneity does not affect the choice of vehicle bundle directly. They can estimate the discrete model with error ε i for each bundle, and then, given predicted bundle shares, they estimate the continuous choices with errors η. Yet, our purpose here is to retain individual-specific heterogeneity η and its effect on bundle choice. Thus, the evaluation of probabilities in our model involves integration over all error components (ε, η), where ε = (ε 1 , ε 2 , . . ., ε J ), and where J is the number of possible vehicle bundles. In our model, the ε i are assumed to be distributed with a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution, and η follows an unknown distribution with a zero mean across individuals. Conditional on η, we integrate over the GEV distribution to obtain conditional choice probabilities as a general nested logit model:
where n and l represent nests, i is an alternative within nest n, m is an alternative within nest l, K is the total number of nests, and B l (l = 1, . . . , K ) represents a nested subset of alternatives. Our nesting structure is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
We also integrate over the distribution of η to obtain unconditional probabilities. The literature offers no guidance on the distribution of the η. 18 To reduce the numerical difficulty in estimation, we let η be uniformly distributed in the interval [−ξ, ξ ] . We search for the ξ that yields a likelihood function with the largest value. 19 As pointed out by Dubin and McFadden (1984) , the random error η does not have a zero mean conditional on each chosen bundle, due to the endogeneity of bundle choice. This can be seen clearly if we rewrite equations (8a-8d) into a more convenient form for estimation (using just equation 8a, as an example):
where d i j is a choice indicator variable equal to one when i = j, and where equations (11b-d) (not shown here) are analogous. The random error η is correlated with the choice indicators d i j . Dubin and McFadden (1984) suggest sequential estimation to solve this endogeneity problem (a procedure later adopted by Goldberg (1998) and West (2004)). First, the discrete choice model is estimated and the predicted probabilities are calculated. They then suggest three alternative methods that yield consistent estimates of parameters for continuous demands: the instrumental variable method (IV), the reduced form method (RF), and the conditional expectation correction method (CE). They derive the correction terms in terms of probabilities for the CE method based on the assumption of an i.i.d. extreme value distribution of ε i . However, since we assume a GEV distribution of ε i , these correction terms cannot be used in our model. We want a method that can be used both for sequential estimation and for our simultaneous estimation, in order to compare them, and so we employ the RF method. Taking expectation of (11a) over η, we have:
where S nj is the probability of individual n choosing vehicle bundle j from (9), u n1 is an additional error to represent the difference between observed VMT and predicted VMT, and where (12b-d) are analogous (not shown here). The sequential RF method applies least squares to (12a-d), except that the shares S nj are replaced by estimated sharesŜ nj from the discrete choice model. In contrast, we estimate (9) and (12a-d) simultaneously.
Since the same parameters appear in both discrete and continuous choice functions, we propose a joint estimation method to capture this simultaneity. In particular, we obtain a set of parameters that maximize the following objective function:
where f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , and g 2 represent the right hand sides (without the random error u n1 ) of the four Eqs. (12a-d), ln L is the log likelihood function of the nested logit, and represents the set of parameters to be estimated by maximizing Eq. (13).
As is consistent with Dubin and McFadden (1984) and other papers in this literature, the maintained hypotheses are that the utility functional form is correct and that consumers maximize it. Under these hypotheses, our procedure produces consistent estimates of parameters. The reasoning is as follows: if the components of (13) were maximized separately, and if some single set of parameters were the solution to all those separate maximizations, then this set of parameters would also maximize the combined objective function. To compare the results, we estimate our model by both the sequential method and the simultaneous estimation method.
Elasticities
Once we obtain the parameter estimates, we are ready to calculate elasticities. To see the marginal effects of prices on indirect utility, and therefore on bundle choice, we use Eq. (7) to obtain explicit formulas for those derivatives. First, define exp
and the marginal effects of income or capital cost on utility take similar forms:
Then we derive the elasticity of choice i with respect to a change in variable z j (where z j may be any of the price variables, income y, or capital cost k j ):
Since these formulas involve the unconditional probability of vehicle bundle i, calculating each bundle elasticity requires integration over η. In contrast, calculations of VMT elasticites do not involve integration over η. For bundle i (i = 1, …, 5), the own-and cross-price elasticities of VMT demand are calculated by:
The elasticities of demand for Wear with respect to its price have a similar form:
We can also calculate the income elasticity, given by:
and the total capital cost elasticity, given by:
In Eqs. (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) , elasticities are typically evaluated at each bundle's mean values of y and k, the bundle average of gas prices per mile ( p 1 and p 2 ) and the bundle average of reimbursement prices (q 1 and q 2 ).
Data and summary statistics
In order to analyze household choice of vehicles, miles driven, and vehicle Wear, we need micro-data on household characteristics, household income or expenditures, and detailed information about household-owned vehicles such as the number of vehicles, miles driven in each, and vehicle characteristics (including miles per gallon, MPG, and emissions per mile, EPM). No single data set contains all such information. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) provides data on household income, characteristics, and household-owned vehicles. 20 For each household, we aggregate expenditures over four quarters, taking demographic data and vehicle information from their last quarter in the survey. We use the CEX from 1996-2000, supplemented with the corresponding OVB file (Owned Vehicles Part B Detailed questions). This OVB file includes data on each vehicle type, make, year, number of cylinders, purchase expenses and financing, time since purchase, mileage, gasoline expenditure, and other information. We keep only households that satisfy several criteria. First, expenditures must be reported consecutively for four quarters of 1996-2000. Second, the household must possess the same number of vehicles during these four quarters. Third, we remove households that own more than two vehicles. 21 We also remove households that have vehicles other than automobiles or SUV's (defined to include light trucks or vans). Finally, we are left with 9,027 households, of which 2,077 own no vehicles, 4,211 own one vehicle, and 2,739 own two vehicles. We use yearly total expenditure as a proxy for yearly income of each household. Table 7 in Appendix defines all the variables used in estimations.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1 for major household characteristics by vehicle bundle. This table shows significant variations in household characteristics across the number of vehicles and bundles. For example, larger households especially with more kids have more vehicles and prefer SUVs. Wealthier households (as measured by total yearly expenditures) possess more vehicles. Households with more workers or income earners have more vehicles. Households with male heads are inclined to have SUVs.
Next, fuel price data are obtained from the ACCRA cost-of-living index for 1996-2000. This index compiles quarterly data for approximately 300 cities in the United States. It also lists average gasoline price for each city for each survey quarter. Since the CEX reports region and state of residence instead of city for each household, we average the city gas prices to obtain a state price for each calendar quarter. For those states reported in the CEX, but not reported in the ACCRA index, we use the average region price as a substitute. Then we assign a gas price to each CEX household based on the state of residence, CEX quarter, and year.
Some of the variables in our model require calculations or additional sources of data. We now describe these extra calculations.
(1) Wear: The vehicle's age is derived by taking the year of the survey minus the year the vehicle was made. We then assume 20 % annual depreciation, and calculate Wear as the percentage of the vehicle's value that has wasted away (given all the vehicle characteristics unchanged except vehicle age 21 In the CEX of 1996-2000, 18.4 % of households own more than two vehicles. Some of these households may be wealthy or may include teenagers with their own vehicle, so selection bias is a potential problem. But a two-person household with a third car may not drive it very much. Also, some households may have a third vehicle for business, whereas our model of household choice assumes utility maximization. value (cmv). We calculate the number of "years since purchase" (ysp), and we subtract depreciation for each year, again using 20 % as the annual rate of depreciation. The formula is cmv = pp ×(1-0.2) ysp . We then estimate a simple hedonic price regression:
where a 0 through a 2 , and b 0 through b 2 are parameters. The variable cyl denotes the number of cylinders, while im is a dummy variable indicating if the vehicle is imported. Wear is included in the regression to capture the effects of vehicle age on market value. Using a sub-sample of the CEX that has all necessary variables, we run separate regressions for cars and SUV's and report the results in Table 8 of the Appendix. 22 Then, for the value of each brand new "concept" vehicle (with Wear = 0), we use:k
whereâ 0 throughâ 2 andb 0 are estimates of parameters in (21). 22 Some estimates in Table 8 Appendix have large standard errors, implying large confidence intervals, but these are the best estimates possible, given data availability. Table 2 . Cars pollute less than SUV's because they were produced under stricter standards. Older vehicles pollute more, both because newer vintages faced stricter standards and because pollution control equipment deteriorates over time. 24 (6) Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT): The OVB file provides cumulative miles on each vehicle, but we need yearly miles driven. Odometer data are imperfect. Some later odometer readings are less than the earlier ones, and many readings are missing. For a one-car household, we take observed annual expenditure on gasoline, divide by the price per gallon to get number of gallons, and then multiply by MPG to get miles. For a two-vehicle household, we only know the total gasoline expenditure, 23 For MPG of new cars, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/index.htm is a website of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy. The EPA also provides the historical fuel economy of new vehicles at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/mpg.htm or at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/tcldata.htm. 24 For vehicles in our sample, the calculated EPM is 1.89 g/mile for the average car and 3.56 for the average SUV. It also increases to 6.94 g/mile for a very old vehicle (with Wear =1). so we need to allocate it between the two vehicles. For this allocation we use the difference in odometer readings. 25 (7) Vehicle bundles: As listed in Table 1 , vehicle choices are classified into six categories according to the number and type of vehicles. For bundle 4, with one car and one SUV, the car is always identified as the first vehicle. For bundles 3 and 5, the first vehicle is identified as the one with higher yearly VMT. If two vehicles have the same yearly VMT, the identification is random. If VMT is missing, then the vehicle with an earlier purchase year is taken as the first vehicle. If the purchase year and miles-driven are both missing, the identification is random.
Estimation results
The model described in Sect. 1 is estimated by both the sequential and the simultaneous estimation methods. The mean values of key variables are reported by bundle in Table 3 . We average the values within each bundle for each bundle-specific variable except gas price per mile. Gas price per mile is calculated by dividing gas price per gallon by a bundle-specific MPG listed in Table 1 . Thus, gas prices per mile vary both within and between bundles. The presence of collinearity between the fixed effects α i 0 (i = 1, . . ., 6) and the bundle-specific variables such as k i (i = 1, . . ., 5) forces us to normalize the fixed effect of bundle one (α 1 0 ) to zero. To facilitate the estimation, we 25 If the difference in odometer readings is positive for both vehicles, then we divide it by MPG to obtain an estimate of each vehicle's gas consumption. Each gasoline amount divided by their sum gives shares, used to allocate the observed total gas consumption. Each vehicle's gallons divided by MPG yields VMT. If the difference in odometer readings is positive only for one vehicle, we use this figure as VMT 1 and calculate gasoline used in this vehicle. Then total gasoline minus gas used in this vehicle is residual gas, allocated to the other vehicle. Dividing this residual gas by MPG yields VMT 2 . If the difference in odometer readings is positive for neither vehicle, then we do imputations based on households with similar characteristics. also normalize y in units of 10,000 dollars, k i in units of 1,000, and q 1 and q 2 in units of 100 dollars. Accordingly, we multiply Wear 1 and Wear 2 by 100 to keep the total amount of reimbursement unchanged in the budget constraint. Notice that bundle 3 and bundle 5 each contains two vehicles of the same type, while bundle 4 consists of one car and one SUV. When the retail gas price increases, all gas prices per mile are affected in bundle-specific ways because MPG depends both on vehicle age and type (car or SUV). As revealed by Table 1 , MPG is more type-specific than bundle-specific. Thus, we expect that the gas price parameters of car bundles 1 and 3 are quite close to one another, as are those of SUV bundles 2 and 5. For a household with one car and one SUV, however, we wish to allow more substitution. In our estimation, we assign one parameter α C1 to the gas price of the only car in bundle 1 and first car in bundle 3 (and α C2 to the second car). We assign one parameter α S1 to the only SUV in bundle 2 and first SUV of bundle 5 (and α S2 to the second SUV). Then we assign two gas price parameters to bundle 4: α 4 p1 (= α 4 C AR ) for the car and α 4 p2 (= α 4 SU V ) for the SUV. Results from the sequential estimation are discussed first. We follow the procedure suggested by Dubin and McFadden (1984) , but at the first stage we estimate a nested logit structure instead of a multinomial logit model. The traditional ML method is employed. The RF method is adopted at the second stage because the correction terms derived by Dubin and McFadden are inappropriate for the GEV error structure. In the second stage we estimate four continuous demand equations jointly (only two equations for the one-vehicle bundles), using an objective function similar to Eq. (13) except that the last term is removed. We constrain parameters to be constant across bundles except those for gas prices and constant terms. The estimation results are reported in the first two columns of Table 4 , under "sequential estimation".
For the discrete choice model in the first column of Table 4 , the estimates of α C1 and α S1 are significant at the 1% level, while those of α C2 and α S2 are not statistically significant. The estimates of α 4 p1 (= α 4 C AR ) and α 4 p2 (= α 4 SU V ) are both significant at the 0.01 level. All of them are negative as expected. The Wear coefficients α q1 and α q2 are also different from zero at the 0.01 level. The parameter λ n (n = 1, 2) measures the degree of independence of the errors of alternatives in nest n. In our model, the estimates of λ 1 and λ 2 are 0.814 and 0.066, respectively, both significant at the 0.01 level. 26 Since all the estimates of α p1 and α p2 are negative, Eq. (14a, 14b) indicate that the marginal effects of gas prices per mile are negative. As consistent with expectation, an increase in gas price reduces household utility. Since the coefficient on the reimbursement price q 1 is negative, the marginal effect on utility is positive as expected. A higher reimbursement price means more money back to the household for accepting a given vehicle age or level of Wear. However, the coefficient on q 2 has unexpected sign. Since estimates of β and β 1 are both negative and significant, Eq. (15a, 15b) indicate that the marginal effect of capital cost is negative while that of income is positive.
We then use those discrete choices from the first column to estimate the continuous demands shown in the second column. A glance down the second column indicates that most of estimated coefficients are quite different from the corresponding estimates in the first column. Yet the parameters in the second column are the same parameters as in the first column, even from the same model, as the continuous demands are supposed to be consistent with a particular indirect utility function. For example, the estimated coefficient on income is −1.408 in the first column and +1.134 in the second column. Both have small errors, and so they are significantly different from each other, even though they are the same parameter of the same model. Many price coefficients also differ significantly in magnitude (and the two estimates of α q2 differ in sign).
Next, the model is estimated by the simultaneous estimation procedure proposed in Section I.C. The point of this procedure is to capture household-specific heterogeneity in both discrete and continuous choices. The two types of choices are connected by the same parameters and the same random error term η appearing in both. 27 In contrast, in the sequential procedure, the bundle choice affects continuous demands (and not vice versa). The simultaneous estimates are reported in the last column of Table 4 .
All ten estimates of coefficients on key variables have the expected signs, and all but two are significantly different from zero. Yet, for many parameters, the estimate differs from both estimates obtained by sequential estimation. For example, the capital cost coefficient (β 1 ) from the simultaneous model (-0.405 ) is smaller in magnitude than either that of the logit model (-0.671) or the continuous demand model (-0.456) . The estimates of coefficients on demographic variables vary with the estimation method, not only in magnitude but also in sign. For most price variables, however, the estimate from the simultaneous model is between the two estimates from sequential estimation, which suggests that the simultaneous model might provide more "reasonable" coeffi- Table 4 b Calculation based on estimates in column 3 of Table 4 cients. These coefficients cannot really be compared directly, however, and so we turn to elasticities.
Elasticity comparisons
Bundle choice elasticities are presented in Table 5 . Each entry in the table is not an elasticity with respect to each price in the model, as it might be difficult to interpret an elasticity such as the change in the probability of holding bundle 3 (two cars) for a change in the price p 1 for gas in the first car only. Instead, we calculate the effect on all choices for a change in the price of gasoline. Also, given vehicle age, a higher reimbursement price q for Wear of a particular bundle means more money back to the household and thus higher probability of choosing that bundle. Again, however, it is difficult to interpret a change in the price q 1 for the first car with no change in q 2 for the household's second car. Instead, we show effects of a change in q for all vehicles (or for all of one type). Rather than raising q, however, policymakers can reduce emissions by taxing old vehicles or subsidizing new vehicles (i.e. reducing q). Table 2 above shows that emissions per mile (EPM) are higher for SUV's than for cars, and rise with either type of vehicle's age.
The upper panel of Table 5 shows elasticities from the sequentially-estimated model, where gas prices have little effect on any bundle choice, and no effect on bundles for two cars or one car and one SUV. Also, a tax on age that reduces q has large effects that are sometimes the wrong sign (encouraging the purchase of two SUV's).
We therefore focus more on simultaneously estimated elasticities. In the lower part of Table 5 , the first row shows that a 1 % increase in the price of gas would decrease most the probability of holding bundle 4 with a car and an SUV (by 0.793 %) while increasing the share holding bundle 3 with two cars (by 0.695 %). In other words, these households sell the SUV for a second car instead. This change is driven by the high price of driving an SUV with low fuel efficiency. 28 The second row of the lower panel shows that a 1 % tax on Wear (lower q for all vehicles) would decrease the probabilities of holding all bundles except bundle 5 (SUV, SUV). In the next row, a tax on the age of cars would decrease the reimbursement for wear on cars, q car , and switch households out of cars and into bundle 2 with an SUV and bundle 5 with two SUV's. Conversely, a tax on the age of SUV's that lowers q suv would induce a switch out of bundles with just SUV's, and into bundles with cars. This tax might actually cut emissions in two ways: by inducing a switch from SUV's to cars (Table 5) , and by inducing a switch from older SUV's to newer SUV's (Table 6 ).
The choice elasticities with respect to y indicate that households with more income switch from holding no car (bundle 6) to one car (bundle 1), and those with a single SUV (bundle 2) seem to add a car (bundle 4). Additional income reduces the share with two cars (bundle 3). These results are inconsistent with the discrete-choice model in the upper panel, where the only bundle with a positive income elasticity is bundle 2 with one SUV.
We next look at an increase in capital cost in the lower panel of Table 5 . Since this change effectively reduces available income, we see that each capital cost elasticity has the opposite sign as that bundle's income elasticity. With higher capital costs, households seem to shift primarily out of two-vehicle bundles with at least one SUV (4 and 5) into bundles with two cars (bundle 3) or only one SUV (bundle 2). While it does not make sense to increase the capital cost only for the first car of a two-car household, it might make sense to increase the capital cost only of cars relative to SUV's or vice versa (to represent a vehicle-type tax). The next row of Table 5 shows that if the increase in capital cost pertains only to cars, then it decreases the shares of the two bundles that have only cars. If it pertains only to SUV's, however, then it has large effects that decrease the shares of all three bundles with SUV's. Such a policy could clearly reduce emissions (given the EPM in Table 2 ). The 1 % higher cost of an SUV means 13.7% less of bundle 4, which seems too large, but it means that the share falls two percentage points (from 14.5 % of all households in Table 3 to 12.5 % of all households). Table 6 shows demand elasticities for continuous choices like Wear and vehicle miles traveled (VMT). These are "short run" elasticities, in the sense that car choices Each entry is the elasticity of VMT or Wear, in the first or second vehicle, with respect to each variable a Calculation based on estimates in column 2 of Table 4 b Calculation based on estimates in column 3 of Table 4 c The last column is the percent change in total emissions, E = EPM× miles, adding over all vehicles in all bundles, for a one percent change in each variable are fixed, and only continuous choices like driving distances may change (Goldberg 1998) . 29 In the top panel, the sequential model uses predictions of discrete choices from Table 5 to estimate continuous demands in Table 6 . Most of the results from the sequential procedure have the correct signs, except in the fifth row where a small increase in income (y) reduces the demand for miles driven (for every vehicle bundle combination).
Again, we focus primarily on simultaneously estimated elasticities in the bottom panel. In the first row, all elasticities for VMT 1 with respect to gasoline price are negative, as expected, for all bundles. The next row of Table 6 shows the effects of a 1 % increase in the reimbursement price, q, on Wear. These elasticities are all positive, as expected: households choose older vehicles when they get higher reimbursement for holding an old vehicle. Conversely, a tax on vehicle age that reduces q by 10 % would reduce desired Wear by about 1.2-1.4 % (assuming the desired cars were available). 30 The table also shows similar effects of changing q just for cars, or just for SUV's. 29 Panel data would be required to distinguish the effects of lags from contemporaneous price changes. 30 In Table 3 , the average Wear of 0.75 corresponds to 6.2 years of age, so a 1.2 % decrease in Wear means a decrease of about one month of age. In the sequential model, the same 10 % lower q affects desired age of one-vehicle bundles by one-tenth as much, and desired ages of two-vehicle bundles by three times as much.
Next, consider income and capital cost elasticities. Due to symmetric specification of demand functions, a 1 % change in y or k has the same effect on both VMT and Wear (whether for the first vehicle or the second). In the simultaneous model, income elasticities are positive as expected. One percent more income would increase driving distances by about 1-1.5 % for all bundles. The capital cost elasticities are negative as expected. 31 Finally, the last column in Table 6 reports the percentage change in total emissions when each variable increases by 1 %. In the simultaneous model, for example, a 1 % increase in all gasoline prices would reduce total emissions by 0.136 %, while a tax on age that reduces q by 1 % would reduce total emissions by 0.434 %. 32 The largest elasticities are from income and capital cost: 1 % higher income raises total emissions as expected, by 4.246 % (but in the sequential model would reduce emissions by 11.47 %) A 1 % increase in capital cost reduces total emissions by about 8 % in either model.
In the simultaneously estimated model, the coefficients are affected by all discrete and continuous choices. The model imposes more constraints on the estimates. Thus, if those constrained estimates are plugged into the likelihood function for either part of the sequential procedure, then the likelihood is not as high as for that portion of the sequential procedure. However, the sequentially estimated model yields two sets of estimates for the same parameters. The finding that these estimates are not consistent with each other raises questions about whether the behavioral model is correctly specified.
Conclusion
This paper focuses on incentive effects of price changes that might be associated with policies to reduce vehicle emissions. We provide a model of household behavior that incorporates both the discrete choice of vehicle type, with different fuel efficiencies and emission rates, and continuous demands for miles driven. Because emission rates depend directly on vehicle age, we also model vehicle age as a continuous choice. To model the effect of prices on the choice of vehicle age, we establish a choice of "concept vehicle" that is separate from the choice of "Wear". Using hedonic price regressions, we quantify the price of Wear. Then, after the discrete choice among concept vehicles, both VMT and Wear become continuous variables that enter utility.
Yearly household data are obtained from the CEX of 1996-2000, supplemented with fuel efficiency estimates from the CARB, and gas prices from the ACCRA cost 31 The specific form for utility in Eq. (4) means a specific form for demands in Eq. (5a, 5b), where ln(VMT) and ln(Wear) both depend on α i p p i − −αi . In other words, the parameter that determines the important effect of gas price on miles (α i p ) also necessarily drives the less-important effect of the gas price on choice of Wear. Similarly, the own-price effect of q on Wear also drives the cross-price effect of q on VMT. We note this fact, but we do not mean to emphasize these cross-price elasticities. 32 These are also short run elasticities, with no change in the number or type of vehicles. Notice that the percentage change in emissions from a change in p is more than twice the change in driving distance, because the higher p also reduces demand for Wear (which also reduces emissions). The change in q also affects both VMT and Wear in the same direction, enlarging the effect on emissions. of living indexes. First, like many others, we follow the sequential procedure suggested by Dubin and McFadden (1984) . This procedure generates two different sets of estimates for the same set of parameters, which we argue is inconsistent with maintained hypotheses about the utility function and utility maximization. We then propose and implement a simultaneous method for consistent estimation of both discrete and continuous choices in one step. Results from the simultaneous estimation differ significantly both in signs and magnitude from both sets of estimates obtained by sequential estimation.
In general, we find that short run price elasticities for continuous variables like VMT are smaller than long-run elasticities for discrete choices. Thus, for example, a tax on age of SUV's might cut emissions both by inducing a switch from SUV's to cars and by inducing a switch from older SUV's to newer SUV's. We emphasize, however, that more work is needed, perhaps using the simultaneous method proposed in this paper.
Appendix
See Tables 7 and 8 . 
